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Abstract
The paper examines the link between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality in
71 countries with different levels of economic development. The results reveal that
ethnic segregation is associated with significantly higher levels of spatial inequality.
This finding is not affected by the inclusion of various covariates that may influence
both spatial inequality and the geographical distribution of ethnic groups, and is
confirmed by a number of robustness tests. The results also suggest that political
decentralization and the quality of government could act as transmission channels
linking ethnic segregation and spatial inequality.
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1 Introduction
Spatial inequality has recently received considerable attention from scholars and deci-
sion-makers. The growing interest surrounding this issue derives from the fact that
spatial inequality, defined as income inequality across geographical or administrative
units within a territorial entity (e.g. country, region), is a crucial component of overall
inequality (Milanovic, 2005). People with similar income levels often concentrate
in space, meaning that increases in spatial inequality are associated –other things
being equal– with greater levels of interpersonal inequality. Spatial inequality is also
important because high regional income disparities may lead to internal conflicts,
undermining social and political stability (Kanbur and Venables, 2005; Østby et al.,
2009).
The impact of different factors on spatial inequality has been profusely examined.
The focus has been mainly on the level of economic development (Petrakos et al.,
2005; Lessmann, 2014), the degree of trade openness (Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2012; Ezcurra
and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2014a), or fiscal and political decentralization (Rodr´ıguez-Pose
and Ezcurra, 2010; Kyriacou et al., 2015). However, the influence of the ethnic com-
position of the population has attracted much less attention. Only a limited number
of studies include an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an additional con-
trol within models which deal with different research questions (e.g. Lessmann, 2012,
2014; Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2013). This type of indices, by contrast, has been
widely used to investigate the effect of ethnic diversity on other aspects of economic
and political performance, starting with the influential contribution by Easterly and
Levine (1997) (see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey of this literature). One
of the problems with fractionalization indices is that, although they contain informa-
tion about the identity and size of the various ethnic and/or linguistic groups, they
incorporate no additional information about other substantive characteristics of the
groups. In particular, these indices do not capture the extent to which the members of
each group are spatially clustered, ignoring the degree of segregation within countries
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011). Nevertheless, ethnic
segregation is an important aspect of regional diversity and there are reasons to expect
that it may affect spatial inequality, as ethnic groups often differ in economic terms
(Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Alesina et al., 2016).
However, despite its importance, existing cross-country studies focusing on spatial
inequality have tended to overlook ethnic segregation. To the best of our knowledge,
only Kyriacou and Roca-Sagale´s (2012) and Kyiriacou et al. (2015) include a measure
of segregation when analysing the effect on regional disparities of the EU structural
funds and fiscal decentralization. Nevertheless, the primary focus of these papers is
not the study of the link between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality. Further-
more, the samples in Kyriacou and Roca-Sagale´s (2012) and Kyiriacou et al. (2015)
comprise respectively EU and OECD countries alone. These are countries where eth-
nic segregation and regional disparities are considerably lower than in the developing
world (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2013). In addi-
tion to these two papers, in one of the robustness tests included in a study on the link
between the quality of government and spatial inequality, Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose
(2014b) also control for the degree of segregation. However, their analysis covers only
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46, mostly well-developed, countries.
Hence, as far as we are aware, no paper has directly addressed the link between
ethnic segregation and within-country spatial inequality across a large number of coun-
tries in the world. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by examining the extent to
which the geographical concentration of ethnic groups shapes regional income dispari-
ties. In order to reach this goal, the paper investigates the relationship between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality in a cross-section of 71 countries with different levels
of economic development. The main aim is to examine whether the geographical con-
centration of different ethnic groups within a country (ethnic segregation) is connected
with higher levels of spatial inequality. This is particularly relevant, as the possible
existence of a positive effect of segregation on regional income disparities would in-
crease the risks that high levels of spatial inequality could be a source of social unrest
and ethnic conflict (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section
2 discusses from a theoretical perspective the relationship between ethnic segregation
and spatial inequality. Section 3 describes the measures of ethnic segregation and spa-
tial inequality used in the paper. In section 4 we present the results of the empirical
analysis. The robustness of our findings is checked in section 5. Section 6 explores var-
ious potential transmission channels linking ethnic segregation and spatial inequality.
The final section offers the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The relationship between ethnic segregation and spa-
tial inequality
There are various reasons to assume that ethnic segregation is related to spatial in-
equality. As pointed out by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), the geographical concen-
tration of ethnic groups increases the risk of secession, which poses a major threat to
peace and stability within a country. Secessionist groups are a force in many parts of
the world, from developing –such as China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, or Sri Lanka– to
well-developed countries –such as Belgium, Canada, Spain, or the United Kingdom.
The threat of secession is generally more serious if the ethnic group aiming to form
its own state is spatially segregated and lives near the border of the country (Sorens,
2005; Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011), as in the cases of Chechnya in Russia, Xinjiang
and Tibet in China, or Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain. Faced with the
risk of secession, national governments may opt for repressive policies, often leading
to internal conflict with potentially important consequences in political and economic
terms. An alternative option, used by numerous countries over the last decades, is to
resort to fiscal redistribution and decentralization as a way to buy-back the loyalty
of separatist regions (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Kyriacou and Morral-Palac´ın, 2015).
Fiscal and political decentralization can help to reduce ethnic conflicts and the threat
of secession by bringing the government closer to the citizens, increasing the opportu-
nities to participate in government and giving groups greater autonomy and control
over their political, social and economic affairs (Brancati, 2006).
From a political perspective, decentralization can be an useful instrument to tackle
2
the risk of secession in countries with high levels of ethnic segregation. In addition,
one may expect more segregated countries to be more decentralized for another reason.
The so-called ‘decentralization theorem’ states that subnational tiers of government
are more capable than central government to tailor the provision of public goods to
the needs of the local population due to the existence of informational advantages and
a better insight into the preferences of citizens (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). In a
country where ethnic groups are geographically clustered, it is likely that the needs
and preferences for public goods provision differ across regions. In such a setting,
the devolution of fiscal and political power from central to subnational governments
can lead to efficiency gains in the allocation of resources and in government activities
(Rodr´ıguez-Pose et al., 2009).
Decentralization may also affect regional disparities. In fact, according to the pre-
vailing opinion, the distribution of any potential economic dividend linked to decen-
tralization is likely to be spatially uneven (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; Rodr´ıguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). The transfer of authority and resources to subnational
tiers of government often benefits the most prosperous regions, which generally enjoy
better socio-economic endowments and higher quality institutions. Decentralization
processes are also likely to undermine the capacity of central governments to play
an equalizing role, further increasing spatial inequality (Prud’homme, 1995). Other
scholars, however, argue that decentralization may be associated with a reduction in
regional income disparities, since it may contribute to a more balanced distribution of
resources across space. For example, in the framework of the second generation mod-
els of fiscal federalism, Weingast (1995) and Qian and Weingast (1997) underline that
fiscal decentralization fuels regional competition. Given that the ability of regional
governments to stay in power depends decisively on their performance in attaining a
level of development and economic growth similar to that of the rest of the country,
policy-makers in poorer regions may attempt to reduce their development gaps by of-
fering more flexible labour markets and/or less generous welfare provisions than richer
regions. Likewise, decentralized countries may do better at reducing spatial inequality
because of the greater political risks that regional disparities pose for such countries
(Shankar and Shah, 2003).
The results of studies testing the link between decentralization and spatial inequal-
ity remain, however, inconclusive. Most analyses dealing with the developed world
find that decentralization contributes to regional convergence (e.g. Ezcurra and Pas-
cual, 2008; Lessmann, 2012). Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill (2004), in a study that covers
developed and developing countries, find mixed evidence depending on the countries,
but a prevailing tendency for the devolution of political and fiscal powers to be asso-
ciated with increasing regional disparities. In turn, the results in Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Ezcurra (2010) and Kyriacou et al. (2015) suggest that the relationship between the
processes of decentralization and spatial inequality may be contingent on the level of
development and the quality of government.
Furthermore, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) argue that segregation adversely
affects government quality. In particular, these authors find that higher segregation
in terms of ethnicity and language is associated with significantly lower quality of
government. A first channel that could explain the link between segregation and
governance is trust. There is abundant evidence showing that individuals prefer to
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interact and associate with other members of their own ethnic group (Glaeser et
al., 2000; Costa and Kahn, 2003). Consequently, countries where ethnic groups are
geographically clustered tend to register less social interactions between members of
different groups, which leads to lower levels of trust –a key component of social capital–
in the country as a whole. Indeed, Uslaner (2008) and Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)
have confirmed empirically the presence of a negative correlation between segregation
and generalized trust. In turn, numerous studies show a negative impact of low trust
on the quality of government (e.g. Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al. 1997).
In addition to trust, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) identify other factors that
may explain the observed link between segregation and quality of government. As
discussed above, the geographical concentration of ethnic groups could increase the
development of independence movements and the threats of secession. In this setting,
national governments may have incentives to spend additional resources in repressive
measures or interregional redistribution initiatives, crowding out other policies that
contribute to improving the overall quality of government (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997,
2003; Kyriacou and Morral-Palac´ın, 2015). Moreover, segregation tends to increase
the relevance of ethnic voting, which may harm institutional quality, especially in
democratic regimes where rules are chosen through competitive elections (Chandra,
2004; Banerjee and Pande, 2007).
A negative association between segregation and the quality of government is par-
ticularly important for our study, as government quality may in turn be related to
spatial inequality (Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2014b; Kyriacou et al., 2015). Coun-
tries with weak institutions and low quality of government are characterized by the
presence of persistent corruption, pervasive rent-seeking, self-serving decision-makers,
and low quality of bureaucracy. This set of problems often gives rise to imperfectly
functioning markets and institutional and government failure, which reduces the ca-
pacity of the public sector to design and implement effective policies that contribute
to improving regional convergence and reducing spatial inequality. Government qual-
ity also plays an essential role in establishing the adequate conditions for economic
interactions and reducing the risks of social unrest and political instability. By de-
creasing uncertainty and transaction costs, governments can facilitate the processes
of technology and knowledge transfer across regions, improving the conditions for
the development of economic activity in lagging regions (North, 1990; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012).
The previous discussion shows that ethnic segregation may affect spatial inequality
through its impact on the processes of decentralization and the quality of government.
However, the different arguments laid down above also show that this is a complex
relationship involving multiple factors and mechanisms, which are often interdepen-
dent. Empirical research is therefore needed in order to shed light on this issue. For
this reason, the rest of the paper is devoted to investigating the link between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality in a cross-section of countries.
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3 Measuring ethnic segregation and spatial inequality
To measure segregation, we resort to the index proposed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya
(2011):
Si =
1
M − 1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
pj(pijm − pim)2
pim
(1)
where pj is the population share of region j in country i, pim is the fraction of group
m in country i, and pijm is the fraction of group m in region j of country i. M and J
represent respectively the total number of groups and regions in country i. Crucially
for the purpose of this paper, S includes a spatial dimension, as it allows to quantify
the degree of geographical concentration of the different ethnic, religious, or linguistic
groups within a country. The value of the index ranges from zero when every region
has the same share of each group as the country as a whole (no segregation), to one
when each region is inhabited by a separate group (full segregation).
When calculating S, it has to be borne in mind that in many regions of different
countries a fraction of the population remains not ascribed to any particular group,
generally under the ‘other’ category. We assume that the ‘other’ group is comprised
of a number of distinct and small subgroups O which cannot be classified adequately
due to the lack of data. We also assume that the different subgroups included in the
‘other’ category are uniformly distributed across all regions in the country, implying no
segregation within the ‘other’ category. Under these two assumptions, the segregation
index S can be rewritten as follows (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011):
Sˆi =
1
N +O − 1
 M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
pj(pijm − pim)2
pim
+ So
 (2)
with
So =
J∑
j=1
pj(pijo − pio)2
pio
(3)
where N is the number of identified groups, pijo is the fraction of ‘others’ in region j,
and pio is the fraction of ‘others’ in the whole population. In the rest of the paper we
focus on Sˆ as our main measure of segregation.
Applying the same classification of groups used in Alesina et al. (2003), Alesina
and Zhuravskaya (2011) measure the level of segregation for three different dimen-
sions of diversity: ethnicity, language, and religion. In this paper we use their indices
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of ethnic segregation, which combine language, self-reported ethnicity, and physical
features (primarily skin colour). To calculate the indices, Alesina and Zhuravskaya
(2011) collect data for subnational administrative units within each country (i.e. re-
gions) on the total population size and the share of the population that belongs to
the various groups. These data are drawn from the census closest to the year 2000,
whenever it was available, national statistical offices, and demographic and health
surveys. Using these sources, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) compute their measure
of ethnic segregation for 97 countries.
In order to measure regional income disparities within each country, we resort to
the population-weighted coefficient of variation. This measure of dispersion, which is
widely used in the literature on regional disparities (e.g. Williamson, 1965; Rodr´ıguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; Lessmann, 2014), adopts the following form:
ci =
1
µ
 J∑
j=1
pj (yj − µ)2
0.5 (4)
where y and p are respectively the GDP per capita and population share of region j in
country i, and µ =
J∑
j=1
pjyj . The advantage of this inequality measure vis-a`-vis other
potential alternative measures is that it is independent of scale and population size,
and satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Cowell, 1995). Moreover, it is not
sensitive to the number of regions within each country (Portnov and Felsenstein, 2005)
and takes into account differences in population size across the regions considered.
This latter aspect has traditionally been overlooked by the literature on economic
convergence, despite the fact that omitting population size significantly biases our
perceptions of spatial inequality (see Petrakos et al., 2005; Lessmann, 2014).
In order to calculate c and match it with Alesina and Zhuravskaya’s (2011) seg-
regation index, we require regional data on GDP and population involving the same
level of territorial disaggregation used to compute Sˆ. This is problematic, because
although the OECD or Eurostat provide regional data for the majority of developed
countries, lack of adequate regional data in developing countries represents a serious
barrier to the analysis. Faced with this problem of information availability, we resort
to the regional data collected by Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2013) and Gennaioli
et al. (2013). Using these datasets, we calculate the c spatial inequality index for
71 of the 97 countries in Alesina and Zhuravskaya’s (2011) sample (see Table A1 in
the Appendix for further details). The level of territorial disaggregation considered in
the analysis usually coincides with the highest administrative division available (i.e.,
states and provinces rather than counties or municipalities) and in a few cases with the
statistical division (e.g., the Eurostat NUTS in Europe) that is closest to it.1 When
1When interpreting the results of the paper, it is important to note that our findings depend ulti-
mately on the level of territorial disaggregation used to measure both ethnic segregation and spatial
inequality. This is relevant because in some countries ethnic segregation and spatial inequality may
occur at a much finer level of territorial disaggregation than that considered in our study, which cannot
be adequately captured by the dataset used in the paper.
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possible, we take the mean value of c over the period 2000-2005 as a baseline, in order
to reduce the potential bias due to the impact of the business cycle on regional income
disparities (Lessmann, 2014).
Tables 1 and 2 show the countries with the highest and the lowest values of Sˆ
and c. Ethnic segregation ranges from 0.001 (Germany) to 0.394 (Zimbabwe) with
a mean value of 0.088 and a standard deviation of 0.105, whereas spatial inequality
ranges from 0.076 (Australia) to 1.112 (Ecuador) with a mean value of 0.375 and
a standard deviation of 0.202. Both ethnic segregation and spatial inequality tend
to be considerably higher in developing countries than in developed ones. Of the
ten countries with the highest levels of ethnic segregation in the sample, only Spain
–a country with sizeable separatist movements– is high income. In turn, Paraguay
is the only developing country with one of the ten least segregated populations in
the sample. Similarly, the states with the highest levels of spatial inequality are all
developing countries, with the exceptions of Russia and Latvia. Malawi, Senegal,
and Armenia are the only developing countries among those with low levels of spatial
inequality.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Given that the aim of the paper is to assess the potential link between ethnic segre-
gation and spatial inequality, we divide the sample countries into two and three groups
according to the value of Sˆ in order to get a preliminary insight into this relationship.
The definitions of the different groups are based on the median (classification into two
groups) and the first and third quartiles (classification into three groups) of the dis-
tribution of the index of segregation. The results in Table A2 in the Appendix reveal
that more segregated countries have, on average, higher levels of spatial inequality. By
contrast, low ethnic segregation is associated with lower regional income disparities.
This is corroborated by the corresponding F-tests, which show that the differences
between the groups in the mean value of c are statistically significant at the 1% level.
This preliminary evidence suggests a positive correlation between ethnic segregation
and spatial inequality.
The descriptive results of Table A2 may, however, be sensitive to the specific num-
ber of groups used to classify the sample countries. More importantly, they may be
biased by the fact that spatial inequality is not only dependent on the degree of ethnic
segregation. This analysis thus provides only a preliminary view of the potential direc-
tion of the relationship between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality, as omitted
variables can seriously affect our perception of how the geographical distribution of
ethnic groups shapes regional disparities. In the remainder of the paper we carry out
a more appropriate statistical analysis.
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4 Is there a link between ethnic segregation and spatial
inequality? Empirical analysis
4.1 The model
Studying the relationship between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality, leads us
to estimate different versions of the following model:
log Ii = α+ βSi + γ
′
Xi + εi (5)
where I is the measure of spatial inequality in country i, S is the index of ethnic
segregation, X denotes a set of variables controlling for additional factors assumed to
influence regional income disparities, including continent dummies for Latin America,
North America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Pacific. ε is the correspond-
ing disturbance term. The coefficient of interest throughout the paper is β, which
measures the effect of ethnic segregation on spatial inequality.
The control variables in vector X have been selected on the basis of existing studies
on the determinants of spatial inequality. They include the average size of the regions
used in each country to compute the magnitude of spatial inequality, the degree of
ethnic fractionalization of the population, the stage of economic development, trade
openness, country size, and a dummy variable for transition countries. The definitions
of all the control variables and their sources are presented in the Appendix.
When estimating model (5), the level of regional income disparities in each country
may be affected by the average size of the territorial units used to compute the spatial
inequality index. This is especially relevant in our analysis, as the average size of the
territorial units used to calculate c differs considerably among countries. In addition,
the size of a country’s regions may have a direct effect on the measure of ethnic
segregation (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011). Hence and despite the fact that the
values of the dependent variable have already been calculated taking into account the
differences in population size across regions, we also control for the average size of
regions in each country as a way to minimize any potential bias emerging from the
heterogeneity in territorial levels across countries.
According to Lessmann (2012, 2014) and Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2013), the
degree of ethnic fractionalization of the population may also affect the level of spatial
inequality within any given country. The findings of these authors seem to indicate
that those countries with a higher degree of fractionalization have greater regional
income disparities. As discussed in the introduction, segregation and fractionalization
are two different notions (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Nevertheless, Alesina and
Zhuravskaya (2011) show that they are positively correlated. We therefore control for
the degree of ethnic fractionalization in the sample countries by means of the index of
ethnic fractionalization compiled by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). These authors
employ the regional data used to compute the measure of segregation described above
to construct an index of fractionalization at the national level for each country. This
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index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a given
country belong to different ethnic groups.2
Since the pioneering work of Williamson (1965), analyses of spatial inequality have
taken into consideration the level of economic development (Lessmann, 2014). Factors
such as the existence of diseconomies of agglomeration, core-periphery spread effects,
technological diffusion processes, or transport infrastructures affecting the location of
private capital suggest that, beyond a threshold level, advances in the economic devel-
opment process may contribute to the spatial dispersion of economic activity (Thisse,
2000; Petrakos et al., 2005). Other approaches, including the endogenous growth
school and the so-called new economic geography, by contrast, highlight that economic
growth is often associated with uneven spatial development (Krugman, 1998; Fujita
and Thisse, 2002). As is common practice in the literature, we use GDP per capita
to capture existing differences in development across the sample countries. Moreover,
following Lessmann (2014), we include in the list of regressors of model (5) the share of
population living in urban areas as a proxy for potential agglomeration effects, which
may affect regional income disparities. Countries with higher urbanization rates tend
also to be characterized by lower levels of ethnic segregation, as group mixing is more
likely in the cities (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011).
The rise in trade over recent decades has also attracted considerable attention as
a potential determinant of regional income disparities (Kanbur and Venables, 2005;
Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2012). The impact of trade on spatial inequality is, however, not
entirely well understood. On the one hand, Heckscher-Ohlin type analyses indicate
that trade contributes to reducing existing disparities, in the cases when capital in-
vestment is attracted by those regions with the lowest cost base, while labour moves
to the highest salary zones. On the other hand, according to this theory, the owners
of abundant factors will benefit from trade, but owners of scarce resources will expe-
rience falling returns, at least in the medium term. New economic geography models
provide different outcomes in relation to the link between trade and spatial inequality,
depending on the theoretical assumptions employed in each case. We therefore control
for the possible impact on spatial inequality of the degree of trade openness, measured
as the ratio between total trade (exports and imports) and GDP.
Spatial inequality may also be related to country size (Williamson, 1965). Larger
countries are often characterized by greater spatial heterogeneity than smaller coun-
tries, which are in general more homogeneous and compact. We use the area of a
country as our measure of country size.
Transition from real socialism to capitalism is also bound to have affected the
location of economic activities and thus spatial inequality. Throughout the 1990s, a
number of countries around the world –and especially in Central and Eastern Europe–
underwent profound changes of a political and economic nature as a consequence of
2The index of fractionalization can be expressed as follows:
Fi =
M∑
m=1
pim(1− pim)
9
the processes of restructuring, privatization, and liberalization that ensued the fall of
communism. These changes have had a significant impact on the spatial distribution
of economic activity, frequently leading to an important increase in the magnitude
of regional income disparities (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2007). Consequently, a dummy
variable for transition countries is included in vector X.
4.2 Results
Table 3 presents the results of estimating various versions of model (5) using OLS
with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The coefficient of the index of ethnic
segregation, Sˆ, is in all cases positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This implies that more ethnically segregated countries have on average higher levels of
spatial inequality, corroborating the preliminary evidence of Table A2. The R-squared
in column (1) of Table 3 indicates that Sˆ alone explains around 16% of the variation
in the dependent variable. At this point it is important to recall that Alesina and
Zhuravskaya (2011) show that both the degree of ethnic fractionalization and the level
of economic development are correlated with segregation. Nevertheless, Table 3 reveals
that Sˆ remains significantly associated with spatial inequality, even when we control
for GDP per capita and fractionalization.3 Hence, ethnic segregation contributes to
explaining the variation in spatial inequality and does not simply capture the effect
of these two covariates. The inclusion of other explanatory variables in the analysis
also does not alter the observed relationship, confirming its robustness and showing
that the effect of ethnic segregation on spatial inequality is not a spurious correlation
resulting from the omission of relevant variables. Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates
the link between ethnic segregation and regional disparities with a partial regression
plot based on all covariates.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
Regarding the control variables in model (5), Table 3 reveals that our results are
in general consistent with the findings in the literature on the determinants of spatial
inequality. There is a negative association between the average size of regions and the
level of spatial inequality in a country. Our estimates also show that more ethnically
homogeneous countries tend to experience lower levels of regional income disparities,
whereas the coefficients of GDP per capita and the share of urban population are
not statistically significant consistently across the various regressions.4 Furthermore,
the relationship between trade openness and spatial inequality is always positive and
statistically significant, confirming the empirical evidence provided by Rodr´ıguez-Pose
3The inclusion of GDP per capita in model (5) is, however, controversial, as this variable may
be a proximate outcome of segregation and fractionalization (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Alesina and
Zhuravskaya, 2011).
4We investigate the possibility that the effect of GDP per capita on regional income disparities may
be non-linear (Lessmann, 2014). The results show that the coefficient of the index of ethnic segregation
remains positive and statistically significant, but the estimates do not support the hypothesis of a
non-linear link between GDP per capita and spatial inequality in our sample.
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and Ezcurra (2010) and Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2013). The magnitude of re-
gional income disparities is also greater in larger countries and transition economies.
Overall, the results in Table 3 show a strong positive correlation between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality. Nevertheless, there are important reasons that
prevent us from interpreting this relationship as causal at this stage. First, the seg-
regation observed in a country is contingent on where people live, and this choice
may be endogenous to the spatial distribution of income. Consequently, segregation
may affect regional disparities and, in turn, be affected by them, triggering a reverse
causality problem. Moreover, the measures of ethnic segregation and spatial inequal-
ity are conditional on internal administrative boundaries. This implies that there may
be omitted determinants of spatial inequality that will naturally be correlated with
segregation. Furthermore, the index of ethnic segregation may be affected by mea-
surement error, which may bias the OLS estimates downward. All of these problems
are potentially important from an econometric perspective, but can be solved with an
appropriate instrument for segregation. Such an instrument must not be correlated
with the disturbance term in model (5), but account for the variation in segregation
observed in the sample. Fortunately, we can use the instrument for ethnic segrega-
tion proposed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). This instrument relates the spatial
distribution of ethnic groups in a country to the ethnic composition of neighbouring
countries. In particular, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) assume that when a specific
ethnic group in the home country is also present in one of the neighbouring countries,
it is likely that the members of this group will tend to concentrate near the border
with this neighbouring country. On the contrary, if a group in the home country is not
present in any of the neighbouring states, it is likely that the members of this group
will be more uniformly distributed across the country, and not located closer to any
particular border. This idea is used by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) to construct
a predicted distribution of the different ethnic groups within the various countries,
assuming that the members of a specific group ‘gravitate’ towards the borders of
neighbouring countries that are populated by people from the same ethnic group. Us-
ing this predicted distributions, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) construct an index
of predicted segregation, which can be used as an instrument for actual segregation.5
In order to assess whether the instrument is correlated with ethnic segregation,
Table 4 presents the results of the first stage regressions of the form:
Si = δ + ζS
p
i + θ
′
Xi + υi (6)
where Spi is the predicted segregation index and υ is the corresponding error term. The
table is organized in the same way as Table 3. As can be observed, in all the regressions
the instrument has a positive and statistically significant effect on actual segregation.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure A2 in the Appendix, which plots predicted
versus actual segregation, conditional on the full set of control variables. Table 4
5See Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011, pp.1889-1893) for further details and examples on the construc-
tion of the instrument.
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also reports the F-statistics for the excluded instrument calculated both under the as-
sumptions of homoskedasticity and heteroskedasticity in the error term. Although the
former is an incorrect assumption in this case, we include it because the cutoff points
proposed by the theory on weak instruments are based only on the homoskedasticity
assumption (Stock et al., 2002). Under this assumption, the F-statistics of the first
stage regressions are in all cases cases well above the threshold of 10 suggested by
Staiger and Stock (1997) when there is a single endogenous regressor. These results
are corroborated by the partial R-squared, which measures the correlation between Sˆ
and the instrument after partialling out the effect of the remaining regressors.6
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
The information in Table 4 indicates that the index of predicted segregation is
significantly associated with actual segregation. To be a valid instrument, however, the
index of predicted segregation should not affect spatial inequality, beyond its impact
through actual segregation. This condition cannot be tested formally in the absence
of other instruments. We therefore discuss various possible arguments that may cast
doubt on the excludability of the instrument. First, national borders do not always
take into account the historical location of ethnic groups, meaning that boundary lines
can split ethnic groups into different countries (Alesina et al., 2011). Although there
are other examples of this type of artificial borders around the world, this situation
is particularly notorious in Sub-Saharan Africa (Herbst, 2000; Englebert et al., 2002).
In most of Sub-Saharan African countries, the borders were drawn during the colonial
period, following in many cases parallels and meridians, and few borders changed after
decolonization. In this setting, the presence of the same ethnic group in two adjacent
countries may influence the index of predicted segregation used as instrument and
affect spatial inequality in other ways than through ethnic segregation. For example,
one may expect that inter-country mobility and trade are more likely when the same
ethnic group inhabits on both sides of the border. In order to address empirically
this concern, we use different strategies. First, we repeat the analysis excluding Sub-
Saharan African countries, where arbitrary borders are especially relevant. Second,
we add to our baseline specification various measures of artificial borders, including
the share of a country’s population that belongs to ethnic groups that are also present
in neighbouring countries. Third, taking into account the possibility that the ethnic
composition of neighbouring countries may influence spatial inequality in the home
country through spatial spillovers across the national borders, we also control for the
level of segregation and fractionalization in neighbouring countries. As can be seen in
section 5, the observed relationship between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality
survives these tests.
Furhtermore, the instrument could also be correlated with the length of state his-
tory and with the process of state formation. In particular, given the nature of the
6In order to confirm that the observed relationship between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality
is not affected by the employment of a potentially weak instrument, we have checked that our results still
hold when we calculate for all the IV regressions presented in the paper the corresponding confidence
intervals using the method proposed by Finlay and Magnusson (2009). This method provides reliable
confidence intervals in the case of weak instruments and is robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
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instrument, one may expect it to be more relevant in countries with a shorter state
history, which tend to be characterized by higher levels of ethnic diversity (Ahlerup
and Olsson, 2012), as ethnic identification can be considered a consequence of mod-
ern state formation (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). This has been
the case of countries such as France, Spain or Great Britain, where the statehood
experience contributed to national identity formation by forging state-level institu-
tions and adopting active policies designed to reduce ethnic heterogeneity and bring
about more homogeneous populations (Tilly, 1992). This process of state formation
contrasts with the experience of most of the European colonies, which were created
and administered with the main purpose of benefiting the colonial powers. The Euro-
peans in charge of the colonial states tended in many cases to use the ‘divide-and-rule’
principle, exploiting existing ethnic conflicts to keep colonies under control, as incen-
tives to ethnically homogenize colonial territories were limited (Ahlerup and Olsson,
2012). These considerations are potentially important in our context. Acemoglu et
al. (2001, 2002), Bockstette et al. (2002) or Chanda and Putterman (2007), among
others, show that state history and European colonization are related to a country’s
economic outcomes, which in turn may affect its level of spatial inequality. We deal
with this potential problem by including in the analysis the length of state history
and the colonial experience of the various countries. As described in detail in section
5, our main results still hold when we control for these factors.
Table 5 presents the results of the second stage regressions. As in the OLS regres-
sions reported in Table 3, the coefficient of the index of ethnic segregation is in all cases
positive and statistically significant. In fact, its size is in general somewhat larger than
in the OLS estimates reported in Table 3. This may have to do with a potential atten-
uation bias generated by measurement error in the index of ethnic segregation. The
regression coefficient from our preferred specification in Table 5 (column 6) reveals
that raising the segregation index by one standard deviation is associated with an
increase in the level of spatial inequality of around 19%. To get a more accurate idea
of the dimension of the impact of ethnic segregation on regional income disparities,
we consider the case of Ghana. Ghana is a country characterized by a medium level
of spatial inequality (c = 0.385), whereas the value of the index of ethnic segregation
in that country is above the sample mean (Sˆ = 0.112). Our estimates indicate that
if Ghana had an index of ethnic segregation similar to that registered for instance by
Cameroon (Sˆ = 0.042), its degree of spatial inequality could be reduced by around
13%. These figures suggest that ethnic segregation has a relevant impact on existing
levels of spatial inequality.7
7As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis focuses exclusively on the relationship between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) also calculate different indices of
linguistic and religious segregation. We have repeated the previous analysis using these alternative
measures. According to the information provided by Table A3 in the Appendix, the OLS regressions show
a positive and statistically significant correlation between linguistic segregation and spatial inequality.
However, in the 2SLS regressions the coefficients of the indices of linguistic and religious segregation
are not significant. This suggests that ethnicity is the most relevant dimension of diversity in the
relationship between segregation and spatial inequality. However, this conclusion should be treated with
some caution, as the identification of people with a particular ethnic group is frequently based on sharing
a common mother tongue.
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[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
5 Robustness checks
So far the analysis has revealed a positive and statistically significant effect of ethnic
segregation on spatial inequality. In this section we test the robustness of this finding.
5.1 Influential observations and impact of different groups of coun-
tries
As a first robustness test we examine the impact of influential observations on the
above results. We check that our findings are robust to the exclusion of any particular
country from the sample. The most influential observations in ‘favour’ of our results
are Belgium and Ecuador, two countries characterized by high levels of ethnic segre-
gation and spatial inequality conditional on the other covariates. In turn, the most
influential observations ‘against’ the results are Turkey and Zimbabwe, two countries
with high ethnic segregation but an intermediate level of spatial inequality conditional
on the remaining covariates. Although the quantitative impact of ethnic segregation
on spatial inequality is affected when these countries are excluded from the sample,
the observed relationship still holds. In order to confirm these findings, we resort to
quantile regression as an alternative to identify the possible influence of potential out-
liers in our sample. Table A4 in the Appendix shows the results obtained when this
method is used to estimate model (5). As can be checked, the coefficient of the index
of ethnic segregation is positive and statistically significant for the various conditional
quantiles of the dependent variable, which confirms that the basic nature of our find-
ings is unaffected by the presence of potential outliers. That said, the estimates in
Table A4 also indicate that the quantitative impact of ethnic segregation appears to
be higher in the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution of spatial inequality.
As an additional sensitivity check, we assess the extent to which our results are
determined by the inclusion of specific groups of countries in the sample. The positive
association detected between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality may be driven
by a particular group of countries. If this hypothesis holds, eliminating that group of
countries would render the coefficient of the ethnic segregation index non-significant.
We therefore re-estimate our baseline specification excluding different groups of coun-
tries (Latin America, North America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Pacific, and
Middle East and North Africa). Despite the reduction of the sample, Table 6 show that
the coefficient of the index of ethnic segregation remains positive and statistically sig-
nificant in all cases. Taking into account the previous discussion on the excludability
of the instrument, it is important to note that the results still hold when Sub-Saharan
African countries, where the presence of artificial borders is especially relevant, are
excluded.
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE]
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5.2 Alternative measures of spatial inequality and ethnic segregation
The results of the analysis may be also sensitive to the choice of the measure used
to quantify spatial inequality. Different inequality measures may yield different or-
derings of the distributions, as each index has a different way of aggregating the
information contained in the distribution (Cowell, 1995). We therefore calculate for
each country the Theil’s first measure of inequality (T (1)), and the standard deviation
of the logarithm of regional GDP per capita (s).8 The results of estimating model
(5) using successively T (1) and s, instead of c, as dependent variables are provided
in Table A5 in the Appendix. The coefficient of Sˆ remains positive and statistically
significant, indicating that the observed connection between ethnic segregation and
spatial inequality holds regardless of the specific measure employed to calculate spatial
inequality.
Our findings may also be affected by the measure of ethnic segregation used. In
order to check whether that is the case, we repeat the analysis using an alternative
index of segregation proposed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). This index implies
ignoring the group ‘other’ and computing the index of segregation exclusively for the
N identified groups.9 The results in Table A5 in the Appendix indicate that the
segregation–spatial inequality relationship is unaffected by the change in the index of
ethnic segregation.
8These measures of inequality can be expressed as follows:
T (1)i =
J∑
j=1
pj
(
yj
µ
)
log
(
yj
µ
)
and
si =
[
J∑
j=1
pj (log yj − µ)2
]0.5
where µ =
J∑
j=1
pj log yj . T (1) is a popular measure in the literature on personal income distribution
and has also been used by researchers working on spatial disparities (e.g. Ezcurra and Rodr´ıguez-Pose,
2013), while in its non-weighted version s has been widely employed in convergence analyses to capture
the concept of sigma convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). As in the case with the population-
weighted coefficient of variation, these two indices are independent of scale and population size. T (1)
also fulfils the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle for the whole definition domain of income (Cowell, 1995).
9The resulting measure of ethnic segregation can be expressed as follows:
S˜i =
1
N − 1
N∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
pj(pijm − pim)2
pim
When calculating S˜ we are omitting the fraction of the population included in the ‘other’ category.
Accordingly, S˜ is only an approximation of the theoretically correct definition of segregation.
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5.3 Additional controls
As an additional sensitivity check, we investigate the possibility that our results are
driven by an omitted variable. This requires controlling for different covariates that
may be correlated with spatial inequality, ethnic segregation, and/or the instrument
used in the analysis, and checking whether the inclusion of these covariates affects our
estimates.
According to the previous discussion on the excludability of the instrument of
predicted segregation, we begin by examining to what extent our results are affected by
the existence of artificial borders between countries that ignore the historical location
of ethnic groups. Two measures of artificial states proposed by Alesina et al. (2011)
are used: i) a measure quantifying the straightness (squiggliness) of borders, based on
the assumption that straight borders are more likely to be artificial; ii) a measure of the
share of a country’s population belonging to ethnic groups partitioned by a political
border. We additionally control for the length of state history using the antiquity index
compiled by Putterman (2007). Taking into account that the probability of natural
state formation is greater in countries that have never been colonized, we also include
in the list of regressors of model (5) a dummy variable to identify former European
colonies. Moreover, we examine whether the impact of the colonization process could
depend on the identity of the colonizer.10 The number of ethnic groups in a country
and the ethnic composition of neighbouring states are also taken into account, as these
factors may be eventually related to ethnic segregation, the instrument and spatial
inequality.
Furthermore, several geographical variables are added to the baseline specification:
an index of terrain ruggedness; the share of the country’s surface covered by mountains,
rivers and other inland bodies of water; dummy variables to identify countries with
non-contiguous territories, landlocked countries, and countries surrounded by water
(the instrument used in the paper predicts zero segregation for island countries);
distance of the coast; and latitude. Ethnic segregation and spatial inequality may
depend on the existence of physical constraints to mobility, as more topographically-
uneven countries display a greater geographical concentration of economic activity
(Ramcharan, 2009). Latitude is related to climatic variability and habitat diversity
within a country (Cashdan, 2001), which may also affect the spatial distribution of
population and income (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012). Additionally, we include in the
list of regressors the number of neighbouring countries, as the number of neighbouring
countries determine the number of hypothetical regions used to calculate the index of
predicted segregation used as instrument.
According to the evidence provided by Alesina et al. (2016), within-country dif-
ferences in income across ethnic groups (i.e. ethnic inequality) is positively correlated
with both ethnic segregation and spatial inequality. This raises the possibility that
the measure of ethnic segregation used in our analysis may simply be capturing the
10The legal origin of the various countries was also included in order to consider any potential role
of legal codes and institutions that may not be fully captured by the measures of colonial experience.
However, the legal origin does not exert a statistically significant impact on spatial inequality and, most
importantly, its inclusion in our baseline model does not affect the observed relationship between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality.
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effect of between-ethnicity inequality. In order to explore if this is the case, we add
to the baseline specification two measures of ethnic inequality calculated by Alesina
et al. (2016). We also investigate whether the observed association between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality still holds when we control for the degree of ethnic
tension within the various countries.
Moreover, Matuszeski and Schneider (2006) find a positive association between
the incidence of civil conflicts and segregation. Given that political instability and
internal conflict may affect the spatial distribution of income within a country (Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003), we also include in the baseline model a dummy indicating
if the country experienced a civil conflict during the period 1995-2005. Finally, the
presence of more or less developed redistributive policies is likely to be linked to
segregation and spatial inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Ezcurra, 2010). Accordingly, any observed connection between ethnic segregation and
spatial inequality may be spurious if existing differences in the capacity of the state
to redistribute financial resources across regions are ignored. We therefore control for
public investment and public consumption as proxies for the redistributive capacity
of the government.
[INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE]
The results of estimating model (5) including these additional controls are pre-
sented in Table 7. The vast majority of the newly-added controls are not statistically
significant and, more importantly, have little impact on the main result of the paper.
The new controls do not affect the estimates of the impact of ethnic segregation on
spatial inequality. The segregation index remains positive and statistically significant
in all cases, confirming, once again, the robustness of our findings.
6 Transmission channels
As described in section 2, ethnic segregation may contribute to increasing spatial
inequality through its impact on the processes of decentralization, and the quality
of government. In order to complement our previous findings, we now present a
preliminary study on the empirical relevance of these potential transmission channels.
This analysis requires comparable data on the level of decentralization across coun-
tries. The devolution of power and responsibilities from central to regional and local
governments is however a complex and multidimensional process and no single in-
dicator captures the real level of decentralization of a country (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Ezcurra, 2010). We therefore resort to various indicators including standard measures
of fiscal and political decentralization. In particular, our indicator of fiscal decentral-
ization is drawn from Schneider (2003) and is based mainly on the subnational share
in total government expenditure and the subnational share in total government rev-
enue (e.g. Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). Despite the
popularity of these measures in the literature, they are not exempt from criticisms, as
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they are based exclusively on the distribution of expenditure and revenue responsibil-
ities between the different tiers of government, but provide no information about the
degree of autonomy of subnational governments (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010).
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the actual powers of subnational
governments, we introduce in the analysis an indicator of political decentralization
proposed by Treisman (2008) to capture decision-making decentralization. This indi-
cator is a dummy variable that takes the value one if, under constitution, subnational
legislatures have autonomy in certain specified areas not explicitly subject to central
laws.11
For government quality we rely on the Worldwide Governance Indicators con-
structed by Kaufmann et al. (1999). These indicators capture six key dimensions
of institutional quality: Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of
violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of
corruption.12 Nevertheless, these six indicators are characterized by very high bivari-
ate correlations (see Table A6 in the Appendix). Specifically, the lowest correlation is
between Political stability and absence of violence and Regulatory quality (r = 0.81),
while the highest is between Rule of law and Control of corruption (r = 0.99). Conse-
quently, the six indicators proposed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) appear to be measuring
the same broad concept rather than successfully distinguishing between different di-
mensions of governance (Langbein and Knack, 2010). In order to avoid any potential
multicollinearity problem, we follow the strategy adopted by various researchers (e.g.
Easterly and Levine, 2003; Seldadyo et al., 2010) and calculate an aggregate index of
government quality equal to the average of the six indicators constructed by Kaufmann
et al. (1999). This approach also reduces the risk of measurement errors affecting the
individual indicators.
We now investigate the relationship between ethnic segregation and the devolu-
tion of fiscal and political power from central to subnational governments, and the
quality of government. The results are summarized in columns 1-3 of Table 8.13 Our
findings show that ethnic segregation is positively associated with the level of political
autonomy of subnational governments, while its effect on the measure of fiscal decen-
11It is important to note that, despite their limitations, the measures of fiscal and political decentral-
ization used in our analysis allow us to capture the two dimensions of a well-functioning federal system
identified by numerous scholars in the political science literature. For example, Obinger et al. (2005,
p. 9) point out that a federal structure comprises “a set of jurisdictional arrangements for allocating
policy responsibilities between different levels of government; this refers to both policy-making and pol-
icy implementation.” In turn, according to Keman (2000), a federal system includes decentralization
with respect to “the right to act” on the one hand, and decentralization with respect to “the right to
decide” on the other. The measure of fiscal decentralization employed in our study is related to the
implementation of government policies through executing subnational administrations and public good
provision (“the right to act”), whereas the indicator of political decentralization reflects the presence of
political decision- and law-making power at subnational level.
12See Kaufmann et al. (2006) for detailed definitions and sources of each indicator.
13The estimates in Table 8 have been obtained by means of 2SLS, despite the fact that the indicator
of political decentralization is a dichotomous variable that takes on the values of zero and one. As
pointed out by Miguel et al. (2004), 2SLS is typically preferred even in cases in which the dependent
variable is dichotomous (Angrist and Krueger, 2001), as strong specification assumptions are required
to justify the use of alternative methods, such as those proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988). In any
case, the results are similar when we use an instrumental variable probit model based on a conditional
maximum-likelihood estimator.
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tralization is not statistically significant.14 Table 8 also reveals that more ethnically
segregated countries have lower government quality, confirming the results obtained
by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
[INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE]
Following the various arguments presented in section 2, we now provide a pre-
liminary test for the potential transmission channels that could explain ultimately
the observed relationship between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality. To do
this, we include in our baseline model the measures of political decentralization and
government quality, which are significantly related to ethnic segregation according
to the previous analysis. If these where valid transmission channels, the inclusion
of these additional controls should reduce the effect of ethnic segregation on spatial
inequality –in terms of coefficient size and/or its statistical significance. Columns 4-7
of Table 8 present the result of the analysis. As can be seen, neither the degree of po-
litical decentralization nor government quality exert a statistically significant impact
on spatial inequality, conditional on ethnic segregation and the remaining covariates.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of these variables influences the relationship between ethnic
segregation and spatial inequality. Column 7 shows that, once we control for political
decentralization and the quality of government, the coefficient of the index of ethnic
segregation still holds positive, but its effect on spatial inequality is statistically sig-
nificant only at the 10% level. Moreover, in this regression the size of the coefficient of
the index of ethnic segregation experiences a 28% decline in magnitude in comparison
with the estimates in column 4. While not conclusive, these findings suggest the pos-
sibility that political decentralization and the quality of government could be possible
transmission channels linking ethnic segregation and spatial inequality, which would
be consistent with the arguments discussed in section 2.
In any case, the exploratory nature of this analysis implies that the information
provided by Table 8 should be treated with caution. In fact, the two mediating vari-
ables considered are highly interdependent, as the degree of decentralization may be
associated with the quality of government (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Enikolopov and
Zhuravskaya, 2007). This makes it difficult to isolate the effect of each particular
channel. Another important caveat is that political decentralization and the quality
of government may themselves be potentially endogenous in this context (Rodr´ıguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; Kyriacou et al., 2015). In order to assess conclusively the
relevance of our hypothesized transmission channels, one should exploit an indepen-
dent exogenous source of variation for each of these variables, a task that we leave
open for future investigation.
14The F-statistics for the excluded instrument suggest that the index of predicted segregation is
weakly correlated with actual segregation in the reduced sample used to estimate the regression in
column 1 of Table 8. Nevertheless, we have verified that ethnic segregation is not significantly related
to the measure of fiscal decentralization using the weak instrument robust test developed by Finlay and
Magnusson (2009).
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7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the link between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality
in 71 countries with different levels of economic development. Our results show a
positive and statistically significant association between ethnic segregation and the
magnitude of within-country regional income disparities. Consequently, more ethni-
cally segregated countries tend on the whole to have higher levels of spatial inequality.
The existence of a causal relationship is confirmed by 2SLS regressions using the in-
strument for segregation constructed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) and based on
the composition of ethnic groups in the home and neighbouring countries. The results
still hold when we control for the level of ethnic fractionalization and the stage of eco-
nomic development. The findings are also robust to the inclusion of other explanatory
variables potentially affecting spatial inequality and the geographical distribution of
ethnic groups, such as country size, the degree of trade openness, artificial borders,
state history, geographical factors, or the redistributive capacity of the public sector.
We have also checked that the results are not driven by influential observations or par-
ticular groups of countries, and that the findings do not depend on the specific measure
used to quantify the levels of spatial inequality and ethnic segregation. Finally, the
analysis also suggests the possibility that political decentralization and the quality
of government could be possible transmission channels linking ethnic segregation and
spatial inequality.
Our research contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of spatial
inequality by underlining the role played by ethnic segregation in explaining regional
income disparities. The results suggest that the spatial distribution of ethnic groups
has important implications for within-country differences in development and there-
fore should be taken into consideration by policy-makers when designing effective ter-
ritorial development strategies. This is of particular importance for countries where
existing ethnic segregation connected to high levels of spatial inequality make the risk
of social unrest and violent armed conflict a real possibility. In particular, the sort
of conditions which put internal stability in jeopardy are more likely to take place in
low- and middle-income countries, as they generally combine greater levels of both
ethnic segregation and spatial inequality.
A number of additional extensions to our work can be derived from the paper.
Some relate directly to the enlargement of the number of countries included in the
sample, which is particularly important to provide a more complete picture about
the nature of the link between ethnic segregation and spatial inequality. Future re-
search will also have to pay special attention to the need to complement and extend
our analysis of the various mechanisms which ultimately explain the impact of the
geographical distribution of ethnic groups on regional income disparities. Only by
pursuing these additional strands, we will be able to attain a fuller grasp of the real
implications of ethnic segregation for the evolution of spatial inequality.
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Tables
Table 1: The most and the least segregated countries.
Most segregated countries Least segregated countries
Country Sˆ Country Sˆ
Zimbabwe 0.394 Germany 0.001
Guatemala 0.384 Sweden 0.001
Turkey 0.357 Netherlands 0.001
Ecuador 0.322 Korea 0.002
Pakistan 0.316 Japan 0.002
Colombia 0.280 Greece 0.002
Morocco 0.253 Paraguay 0.002
South Africa 0.247 Slovenia 0.003
Spain 0.244 Hungary 0.003
Kenya 0.235 Ireland 0.003
Note: The measure of ethnic segregation was drawn from
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Table 2: The most and the least unequal countries.
Most unequal countries Least unequal countries
Country c Country c
Ecuador 1.112 Australia 0.076
Russia 0.931 Malawi 0.121
Kenya 0.910 Netherlands 0.137
Indonesia 0.891 Greece 0.156
Guatemala 0.700 Senegal 0.163
Kazakhstan 0.688 United States 0.167
Philippines 0.622 Canada 0.170
Mexico 0.602 Finland 0.171
Latvia 0.593 Armenia 0.186
China 0.586 New Zealand 0.188
Note: See Table A1 in the Appendix for further details on
the sources of regional data on GDP and population used to
calculate c.
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Table 3: Spatial inequality and ethnic segregation: OLS regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ethnic segregation 1.952*** 1.672*** 1.727*** 1.467*** 1.790*** 1.532***
(0.550) (0.578) (0.521) (0.457) (0.520) (0.457)
Average size of regions -0.223*** -0.256*** -0.226*** -0.260***
(0.065) (0.070) (0.070) (0.073)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.439** 0.449**
(0.179) (0.184)
GDP per capita 0.119 0.126*
(0.078) (0.068)
Urban population -0.006 -0.006*
(0.004) (0.003)
Trade openness 0.509*** 0.528*** 0.529*** 0.549***
(0.145) (0.144) (0.137) (0.134)
Area 0.334*** 0.359*** 0.345*** 0.371***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.069) (0.071)
Transition 0.391*** 0.362*** 0.446*** 0.420***
(0.101) (0.099) (0.110) (0.102)
Constant -1.281*** -1.900*** -4.310*** -4.426*** -5.058*** -5.231***
(0.069) (0.146) (0.587) (0.543) (0.839) (0.739)
Continent dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.162 0.406 0.671 0.701 0.686 0.719
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the log of c. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: First stage regressions: Segregation and predicted segregation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Predicted ethnic segreg. 0.623*** 0.578*** 0.566*** 0.543*** 0.582*** 0.563***
(0.153) (0.141) (0.130) (0.135) (0.146) (0.146)
Average size of regions -0.018 -0.022 -0.019 -0.023
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.074 0.072
(0.045) (0.046)
GDP per capita 0.012 0.013
(0.023) (0.022)
Urban population -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Trade openness 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.011
(0.038) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036)
Area 0.018 0.022 0.021 0.025
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Transition -0.049** -0.051*** -0.046* -0.048**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023)
Constant 0.051*** 0.172*** 0.111 0.086 0.059 0.025
(0.011) (0.020) (0.131) (0.129) (0.193) (0.194)
Continent dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat. (hom.) 41.03*** 38.39*** 35.71*** 33.22*** 30.42*** 28.93***
F-stat. (het.) 16.52*** 16.87*** 18.82*** 16.09*** 15.99*** 14.89***
Partial R-squared 0.373 0.379 0.377 0.364 0.348 0.341
R-squared 0.373 0.499 0.535 0.556 0.557 0.577
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the index of ethnic segregation Sˆ. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 5: Spatial inequality and ethnic segregation: Second stage regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Predicted ethnic seg. 2.036** 1.870** 1.556** 1.309** 2.001*** 1.808***
(0.823) (0.800) (0.684) (0.561) (0.720) (0.604)
Average size of regions -0.227*** -0.261*** -0.221*** -0.251***
(0.061) (0.065) (0.066) (0.068)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.456*** 0.422**
(0.173) (0.175)
GDP per capita 0.128* 0.138**
(0.072) (0.061)
Urban population -0.006* -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Trade openness 0.506*** 0.526*** 0.533*** 0.553***
(0.135) (0.132) (0.124) (0.120)
Area 0.339*** 0.364*** 0.339*** 0.362***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067)
Transition 0.385*** 0.355*** 0.460*** 0.439***
(0.093) (0.091) (0.105) (0.096)
Constant -1.288*** -1.950*** -4.281*** -4.406*** -5.166*** -5.353***
(0.094) (0.203) (0.535) (0.485) (0.782) (0.659)
Continent dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.161 0.405 0.670 0.701 0.685 0.716
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the log of c. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
29
T
a
b
le
6:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
an
al
y
si
s:
Im
p
ac
t
of
d
iff
er
en
t
gr
ou
p
s
of
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
E
th
n
ic
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
1.
44
9*
*
1
.7
9
8
*
*
*
1
.7
8
5
*
*
2
.1
1
7
*
*
*
2
.1
4
8
*
*
*
1
.8
9
5
*
*
*
1
.7
6
2
*
*
*
(0
.5
85
)
(0
.6
0
8
)
(0
.8
3
9
)
(0
.8
0
6
)
(0
.6
1
8
)
(0
.6
1
9
)
(0
.6
0
5
)
O
m
it
te
d
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
L
at
in
N
o
rt
h
E
u
ro
p
e
S
u
b
-S
a
h
.
A
si
a
P
a
ci
fi
c
M
E
N
A
A
m
er
ic
a
A
m
er
ic
a
A
fr
ic
a
C
on
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
73
7
0
.7
0
3
0
.7
4
4
0
.7
4
0
0
.6
7
3
0
.7
0
9
0
.7
1
3
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
om
.)
31
.2
7*
**
2
8
.3
5
*
*
*
1
8
.1
7
*
*
*
1
5
.7
8
*
*
*
2
3
.4
7
*
*
*
2
8
.2
4
*
*
*
2
7
.8
8
*
*
*
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
12
.2
5*
**
1
4
.9
5
*
*
*
2
0
.4
8
*
*
*
8
.9
3
*
*
*
1
3
.3
4
*
*
*
1
4
.9
4
*
*
*
1
4
.9
0
*
*
*
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
58
6
9
4
4
5
9
5
7
6
9
69
N
o
te
s:
S
ec
o
n
d
st
a
g
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
in
a
ll
ca
se
s
th
e
lo
g
o
f
c.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
A
ll
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
n
d
th
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
4
.1
.
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
o
m
.)
’
a
n
d
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
’
re
p
o
rt
th
e
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
in
st
ru
m
en
t
fr
o
m
th
e
fi
rs
t
st
a
g
e
u
n
d
er
th
e
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
h
o
m
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
v
el
.
30
T
ab
le
7:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
an
al
y
si
s:
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
co
n
tr
o
ls
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
E
th
n
ic
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
2.
07
2*
**
2.
27
3*
**
1
.8
6
3
*
*
*
1.
8
2
1*
*
*
1
.9
3
8
*
*
*
2
.0
3
2
*
**
2
.1
5
7
*
*
*
1
.6
9
0
*
*
*
1
.7
2
8
*
*
*
1
.4
8
2
*
*
1
.7
36
*
*
*
(0
.6
18
)
(0
.6
92
)
(0
.6
1
1
)
(0
.6
0
4
)
(0
.5
4
9
)
(0
.7
3
5
)
(0
.6
1
8
)
(0
.6
2
1
)
(0
.6
42
)
(0
.6
0
3)
(0
.5
5
9
)
S
q
u
ig
gl
in
es
s
-2
.1
75
(2
.3
00
)
P
ar
ti
ti
on
ed
-0
.0
03
(0
.0
02
)
S
ta
te
an
ti
q
u
it
y
-0
.1
3
5
(0
.0
9
4
)
F
or
m
er
co
lo
n
y
0
.0
2
4
(0
.1
8
3
)
S
p
an
is
h
co
lo
n
y
0
.2
57
*
(0
.1
5
0
)
B
ri
ti
sh
co
lo
n
y
-0
.2
6
6
*
(0
.1
5
8
)
F
re
n
ch
co
lo
n
y
-0
.2
6
1
(0
.2
0
7
)
P
or
tu
gu
es
e
co
lo
n
y
0.
3
2
4
(0
.2
1
8
)
N
u
m
b
er
of
et
h
n
ic
gr
ou
p
s
0
.0
3
7
(0
.0
52
)
E
th
n
ic
se
gr
.
n
ei
gh
b
.
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-0
.0
3
1
(0
.5
3
7
)
E
th
n
ic
fr
ac
.
n
ei
gh
.
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-0
.1
1
6
(0
.2
1
1
)
R
u
gg
ed
n
es
s
0
.0
4
0
(0
.0
3
4
)
M
ou
n
ta
in
s
0
.1
4
0
(0
.1
6
6
)
R
iv
er
s
-0
.0
2
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
8
)
N
on
-c
on
ti
gu
ou
s
te
rr
it
or
y
-0
.0
4
3
(0
.1
1
0
)
C
on
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
71
3
0.
71
2
0
.7
4
0
0
.7
1
6
0
.7
3
9
0.
7
13
0
.7
0
9
0
.7
2
3
0
.7
2
0
0
.7
3
6
0
.7
1
8
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
om
.)
29
.5
4*
**
22
.5
7*
**
30
.6
3
*
*
*
2
8
.1
8
*
*
*
3
2
.7
2
*
**
1
9
.5
5
*
*
*
2
9
.1
0
*
*
*
2
7.
2
2
*
**
26
.9
3
5*
*
*
2
5
.6
2
*
*
*
3
0
.4
8
*
*
*
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
14
.8
3*
**
14
.9
7*
**
1
7.
1
5
**
*
1
3
.7
4
*
*
*
1
5
.7
3
*
*
*
11
.9
6
*
*
*
1
3
.1
1
*
*
*
1
3
.9
9
*
*
*
1
3.
2
8
*
**
1
3
.4
0
*
*
*
1
5
.1
7
*
*
*
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
65
60
6
9
7
1
7
1
7
1
6
5
7
1
7
1
7
1
71
N
o
te
s:
S
ec
o
n
d
st
a
g
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
in
a
ll
ca
se
s
th
e
lo
g
o
f
c.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
A
ll
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
n
d
th
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
4
.1
.
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
o
m
.)
’
a
n
d
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
’
re
p
o
rt
th
e
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
in
st
ru
m
en
t
fr
o
m
th
e
fi
rs
t
st
a
g
e
u
n
d
er
th
e
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
h
o
m
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
v
el
.
31
T
a
b
le
7:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
an
al
y
si
s:
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
co
n
tr
ol
s.
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
a
ti
o
n
.)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
(1
6
)
(1
7
)
(1
8
)
(1
9
)
(2
0
)
(2
1
)
(2
2
)
E
th
n
ic
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
1.
81
2*
**
1.
82
7*
**
1
.8
3
1
*
**
1
.8
2
8
*
*
*
1
.8
3
6
*
*
*
1
.7
2
2
**
*
1
.7
9
6
*
*
*
1
.6
8
3
*
*
*
1
.8
2
0
*
*
*
1
.9
8
1
*
*
*
1
.8
1
8
**
*
(0
.5
94
)
(0
.6
02
)
(0
.5
9
2
)
(0
.5
9
3
)
(0
.6
0
5
)
(0
.6
6
1
)
(0
.5
8
8
)
(0
.5
5
2
)
(0
.6
4
9
)
(0
.6
7
0
)
(0
.6
0
4
)
L
an
d
lo
ck
ed
-0
.0
19
(0
.0
79
)
Is
la
n
d
0.
21
8
(0
.1
61
)
D
is
ta
n
ce
to
th
e
co
as
t
-0
.0
4
8
(0
.1
0
6
)
L
at
it
u
d
e
-0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
4
)
N
u
m
b
er
of
n
ei
gh
b
.
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
-0
.0
1
4
(0
.0
1
5
)
E
th
n
ic
in
eq
u
al
it
y
(G
R
E
G
)
-0
.1
7
3
(0
.2
0
0
)
E
th
n
ic
in
eq
u
al
it
y
(E
th
n
ol
.)
-0
.2
6
1
(0
.1
9
8)
E
th
n
ic
te
n
si
on
s
-0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
3
6
)
In
te
rn
al
co
n
fl
ic
t
-0
.0
1
4
(0
.1
1
9
)
P
u
b
li
c
in
v
es
tm
en
t
-0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
1
6
)
P
u
b
li
c
co
n
su
m
p
ti
on
0
.2
0
9
(0
.6
2
4
)
C
on
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
71
7
0.
72
0
0
.7
1
7
0
.7
1
7
0
.7
1
9
0.
7
20
0
.7
2
3
0
.7
3
9
0
.7
1
6
0
.7
1
7
0
.7
1
7
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
om
.)
30
.0
6*
**
28
.3
7*
**
28
.9
1
*
*
*
2
9
.6
1
*
*
*
2
8
.5
0
*
**
2
6
.4
5
*
*
*
3
0
.7
5
*
*
*
2
7.
6
7
*
**
27
.4
3
**
*
2
4
.3
8*
*
*
2
8
.1
8
*
*
*
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
13
.2
9*
**
14
.6
9*
**
1
3.
7
4
**
*
1
3
.8
1
*
*
*
1
4
.4
4
*
*
*
13
.9
4
*
*
*
1
6
.1
7
*
*
*
1
5
.7
7
*
*
*
1
4
.4
1
*
*
*
1
4
.2
7
*
*
*
1
4.
4
2
**
*
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
71
71
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
7
1
6
8
7
1
6
8
7
1
N
o
te
s:
S
ec
o
n
d
st
a
g
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
in
a
ll
ca
se
s
th
e
lo
g
o
f
c.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
A
ll
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
n
d
th
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
4
.1
.
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
o
m
.)
’
a
n
d
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
’
re
p
o
rt
th
e
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
in
st
ru
m
en
t
fr
o
m
th
e
fi
rs
t
st
a
g
e
u
n
d
er
th
e
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
h
o
m
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
v
el
.
32
T
ab
le
8
:
S
p
at
ia
l
in
eq
u
al
it
y
an
d
et
h
n
ic
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
:
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
ch
an
n
el
s.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
F
is
ca
l
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
S
p
a
ti
a
l
S
p
a
ti
a
l
S
p
a
ti
a
l
S
p
a
ti
a
l
d
ec
en
tr
al
.
a
u
to
n
o
m
y
q
u
a
li
ty
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
E
th
n
ic
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
0.
87
6
2
.0
6
0
*
*
*
-2
.1
9
6
*
*
*
1
.5
8
9
*
*
*
1.
3
7
3
*
*
1
.4
1
3
*
*
1
.1
3
6
*
(0
.6
36
)
(0
.7
7
1
)
(0
.6
7
5
)
(0
.5
6
3
)
(0
.5
4
3
)
(0
.6
3
0
)
(0
.6
3
2
)
P
ol
it
ic
al
au
to
n
om
y
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
1
4
(0
.0
9
5
)
(0
.0
9
2
)
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
q
u
al
it
y
-0
.0
8
0
-0
.0
9
9
(0
.1
1
1
)
(0
.1
1
9
)
C
on
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0.
47
4
0
.1
7
4
0
.8
9
1
0
.7
4
0
0
.7
4
2
0
.7
4
0
0
.7
4
1
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
om
.)
5.
72
**
3
3
.2
8
*
*
*
2
8
.9
3
*
*
*
3
3
.2
8
*
*
*
29
.4
7
*
*
*
2
6
.2
2
*
*
*
2
2
.7
2
*
*
*
F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
9.
47
**
*
1
4
.2
1
*
*
*
1
4
.8
8
*
*
*
1
4
.2
1
*
*
*
1
1
.2
3
*
*
*
1
0
.9
9
*
*
*
8
.5
7
*
*
*
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
46
6
3
7
1
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
N
o
te
s:
S
ec
o
n
d
st
a
g
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
A
ll
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
ti
n
en
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
n
d
th
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
4
.1
.
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
o
m
.)
’
a
n
d
‘F
-s
ta
t.
(h
et
.)
’
re
p
o
rt
th
e
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
in
st
ru
m
en
t
fr
o
m
th
e
fi
rs
t
st
a
g
e
u
n
d
er
th
e
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
h
o
m
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
le
v
el
,
*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
le
v
el
.
33
APPENDIX
Definitions and sources of control variables
Average size of regions: Log of the average area of the country’s regions expressed in
square kilometres. Source: Own elaboration.
Ethnic fractionalization: Index of ethnic fractionalization based on aggregated re-
gional data. The index captures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn
from the population belong to different ethnic groups. Source: Alesina and Zhu-
ravskaya (2011).
Linguistic fractionalization: Index of linguistic fractionalization based on aggregated
regional data. The index captures the probability that two individuals randomly
drawn from the population belong to different linguistic groups. Source: Alesina and
Zhuravskaya (2011).
Religious fractionalization: Index of religious fractionalization based on aggregated
regional data. The index captures the probability that two individuals randomly
drawn from the population belong to different religious groups. Source: Alesina and
Zhuravskaya (2011).
GDP per capita: Log of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity and ex-
pressed in constant 2005 international dollars. Average of the years 1995-2005. Source:
Penn World Table 7.1. (Heston et al., 2012).
Urban population: Fraction of the total population living in urban areas. Average of
the years 1995-2005. Source: World Development Indicators.
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a
share of GDP. Average of the years 1995-2005. Source: World Development Indicators.
Area: Log of country’s total area expressed in square kilometres. Source: World
Development Indicators.
Transition: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is a transition
economy, zero otherwise. Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Squiggliness: Log of fractal dimension of country’s non-coastline border. Source:
Alesina et al. (2011).
Partitioned: Fraction of country’s population belonging to ethnic groups partitioned
by a border. Source: Alesina et al. (2011).
State antiquity: Log of discounted sum of years of ancient statehood, 1 AD to 1950
AD. Source: Putterman (2007).
Former colony: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is a former
European colony, zero otherwise. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
British colony: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is a former
British colony, zero otherwise. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
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French colony: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is a former
French colony, zero otherwise. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Spanish colony: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is a former
Spanish colony, zero otherwise. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Portuguese colony: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is a former
Portuguese colony, zero otherwise. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Number of ethnic groups: Log of number of ethnic groups in each country. Source:
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Ethnic segregation in neighbouring countries: Population-weighted average of the de-
gree of ethnic segregation in neighbouring countries. Ethnic segregation in each coun-
try is calculated according to expression (2). Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Ethnic fractionalization in neighbouring countries: Population-weighted average of the
degree of ethnic fractionalization in neighbouring countries. Ethnic fractionalization
in each country captures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from
the population belong to different ethnic groups. Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya
(2011).
Ruggedness: Index of terrain ruggedness. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Mountains: Measure of the extent to which a country’s surface is covered by moun-
tains. Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Rivers: Measure of the extent to which a country is covered by rivers or other inland
bodies of water. Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Non-contiguous state: Dummy variable that takes the value one for those countries
with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area con-
taining the capital city either by land or by 100 kilometers of water, zero otherwise.
Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Landlocked: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is entirely en-
closed by land, or whose only coastlines lie on closed seas, zero otherwise. Source:
Global Development Network Growth Database (World Bank).
Island: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is surrounded by water
and has no bordering countries, and zero otherwise. Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya
(2011).
Distance to coast: Average distance to nearest ice-free coast (1000 km). Source: Nunn
and Puga (2012).
Latitude: Absolute value of the latitude of the country. Source: Own elaboration with
data drawn from Nunn and Puga (2012).
Number of neighbouring countries: Number of neighbouring countries. Source: CIA,
The World Factbook.
Ethnic inequality (GREG): Gini index that reflects the differences in mean income
–as captured by luminosity per capita at the ethnic homeland– across ethnic groups.
The location of the various ethnic groups is identified using the Geo-Referencing of
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Ethnic Groups (GREG), which is the digitized version of the Soviet Atlas Narodov
Mira. Source: Alesina et al. (2016).
Ethnic inequality (Ethnologue): Gini index that reflects the differences in mean income
–as captured by luminosity per capita at the ethnic homeland– across ethnic groups.
The location of the various ethnic groups is identified using the Ethnologue. Source:
Alesina et al. (2016).
Ethnic tensions: Index of the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial,
nationality, or language divisions. Lower values indicate more tensions. Average of
the years 1995-2005. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Civil conflict: Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country has experi-
enced a civil armed conflict between 1995 and 2005, and zero otherwise. A country is
recorded as having experienced a civil armed conflict in a given year if a threshold of
25 or more battle-related deaths has been met. Source: UCDP/PRIO.
Public investment: General government investment (gross fixed capital formation),
expressed as a share of GDP. Average of the years 1995-2005. Source: IMF Investment
and Capital Stock Dataset (International Monetary Fund, 2015).
Public consumption: General government final consumption expenditure expressed
as a share of GDP. Average of the years 1995-2005. Source: World Development
Indicators.
Fiscal decentralization: Measure of fiscal decentralization obtained using factor anal-
ysis of data from 1996 on six indicators: subnational expenditures as a percentage
of total expenditures, subnational revenues as a percentage of total revenues, relative
importance of taxes as a percentage of subnational revenues, relative importance of
transfers as a percentage of subnational revenues, existence of municipal elections, and
existence of state or provincial elections. Source: Schneider (2003).
Political autonomy: Dummy variable that takes the value one if, under constitution,
subnational legislatures have autonomy in certain specified areas not explicitly subject
to central laws, zero otherwise. Source: Treisman (2008).
Government quality: Average of the six indicators of the quality of government pro-
posed by Kaufmann et al. (1999). The six indicators are: Voice and accountability,
Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory qual-
ity, Rule of law, and Control of corruption. Average of the period 1996-2005. Source:
Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
References
Alesina, A. and Zhuravskaya, E. (2011): Segregation and the quality of government
in a cross section of countries, American Economic Review 101, 1872-1911.
Alesina, A., Easterly, W. and Matuszeski, J. (2011): Artificial states, Journal of the
European Economic Association 9, 246-277.
Alesina, A., Michalopoulos, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2016): Ethnic inequality, Journal
36
of Political Economy 124, 428-488.
Ezcurra, R. and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, A. (2013): Does economic globalization affect re-
gional inequality? A cross-country analysis, World Development 52, 92-103.
Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2003): Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, American
Political Science Review 97, 75-90.
Gennaioli, N., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2013): Human
capital and regional development, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, 105-164.
Heston, A. Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2012): Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University
of Pennsylvania.
International Monetary Fund (2015): Making Public Investment more Efficient. IMF
Staff Report. Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Zoido-Lobato´n, P. (1999): Governance matters. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, World Bank.
Nunn, N. and Puga, D. (2012): Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa,
Review of Economics and Statistics 94, 20-36.
Putterman, L. (2007): State Antiquity Index Dataset, version 3. Brown University.
Treisman, D. (2008): Decentralization dataset. Available at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.
edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/.
37
Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Partial regression plot: Spatial inequality and ethnic segregation.
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Figure A2: Partial regression plot: Segregation and predicted segregation.
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Table A3: Linguistic segregation, religious segregation, and spatial inequality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method 0LS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Linguistic segregation 0.774* 0.878
(0.459) (0.610)
Linguistic fractionalization 0.266 0.254
(0.228) (0.204)
Religious segregation 1.132 1.559
(1.110) (1.144)
Religious fractionalization 0.012 -0.013
(0.348) (0.318)
Average size of regions -0.273*** -0.234** -0.269*** -0.218***
(0.080) (0.100) (0.077) (0.077)
GDP per capita 0.072 0.062 0.077 0.064
(0.089) (0.113) (0.080) (0.097)
Urban population -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Trade openness 0.572*** 0.400* 0.579*** 0.381**
(0.174) (0.222) (0.160) (0.188)
Area 0.376*** 0.368*** 0.373*** 0.345***
(0.079) (0.088) (0.075) (0.074)
Transition 0.284** 0.263* 0.290** 0.257*
(0.122) (0.154) (0.113) (0.131)
Constant -4.538*** -3.900*** -4.589*** -4.941***
(0.979) (0.996) (0.884) (1.072)
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.631 0.648 0.631 0.646
F-stat. (hom.) 14.95*** 17.74***
F-stat. (het.) 12.44*** 4.77**
Observations 64 49 64 49
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the log of c. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ‘F-stat. (hom.)’ and ‘F-stat. (het.)’ report the F-statistics for the
excluded instrument from the first stage under the assumptions of homoskedasticity
and heteroskedasticity respectively. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table A5: Robustness analysis: Alternative measures of spatial inequality and ethnic
segregation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable c T (1) s c T (1) s
Ethnic segregation (Sˆ) 1.808*** 3.336*** 1.481***
(0.604) (1.003) (0.476)
Ethnic segregation (S) 1.846** 3.428*** 1.550**
(0.779) (1.330) (0.623)
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.716 0.732 0.735 0.689 0.700 0.700
F-stat. (hom.) 28.93*** 28.93*** 28.93*** 12.90*** 12.90*** 12.90***
F-stat. (het.) 14.89*** 14.89*** 14.89*** 8.85*** 8.85*** 8.85***
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Notes: The dependent variables are expressed in logs. Second stage regressions. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ‘F-stat. (hom.)’ and ‘F-stat. (het.)’ report the F-statistics for the excluded
instrument from the first stage under the assumptions of homoskedasticity and heteroskedasticity
respectively. All the regressions include continent dummies and the full set of control variables
described in section 4.1. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1%
level.
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Table A6: Correlation coefficients between the various dimensions of government quality.
Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of
accountability stability effectiveness quality law corruption
Voice and 1.000
accountability
Political 0.813 1.000
stability
Government 0.868 0.813 1.000
effectiveness
Regulatory 0.915 0.812 0.933 1.000
quality
Rule of 0.887 0.855 0.981 0.924 1.000
law
Control of 0.870 0.827 0.985 0.916 0.986 1.000
corruption
Note: The value of each indicator is the mean over the period 1996-2005. All the correlation coefficients
are statistically significant at the 1% level.
45
